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Why Do Women Co-Operate More
in Women’s Groups?
James D. Fearon and Macartan Humphreys1
1. Introduction
A substantial amount of development programming assumes that women
have preferences or aptitudes that are more conducive to economic develop-
ment. And indeed development funding is often channelled through women’s
groups rather than through all-male or mixed-gender traditional and modern
authorities. For example, conditional cash transfer programmes commonly
deliver funding to female household heads, and many microcredit schemes
focus on women’s savings groups. Programmes and reforms to increase
women’s empowerment in low-income countries are advocated on the
grounds that, in addition to simple fairness, women in political ofﬁce will
spendmore on public goods or onmore-needed public goods, and empowered
women in families will lead to more investment in agricultural productivity
and children’s health and education. Duﬂo (2012) reviews a growing literature
assessing these and related hypotheses. Many studies ﬁnd evidence that direct-
ing resources or political power towards women and women’s groups increases
1 This chapter uses data from an experiment implemented jointly with Jeremy Weinstein, to
whom we are deeply indebted. We thank also Nicholai Lidow and Gwendolyn Taylor for leading
the game and follow-up survey data collection teams in the ﬁeld, and Andrea Abel, Jessica Gottlieb,
and Amanda Robinson for their ﬁeldwork on the public goods games. We thank the National
Ex-Combatant Peace-Building Initiative for its research support in Liberia, in particular K. Johnson
Borh andMorlee Zawoo, and Brian Coyne. We thank Lily Medina for excellent research support for
the analysis of this chapter. AUSAID, through a grant to the Center for Global Development,
provided the resources to implement the behavioural measures described in this chapter; the
Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law provided funding for ﬁeldwork
expenses, and the International Growth Center provided support for ﬁnal data compilation and
analysis.
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children’s well-being and public investments in cleanwater and (perhaps) other
public goods.2
In this regard, the views of the development community (Gates 2014;
World Bank 2012) often reﬂect those of the rural poor in many low-income
countries. For example, it is often held that extra cash is more likely to be
spent on alcohol and grilled meat by men, versus household needs or pro-
ductive investment by women.Womenmay also be seen asmore community-
minded on average—indeed our own survey data, described below, reﬂects
such views.
What is not clear from these accounts, however, is whether these beliefs
reﬂect views about the attitudes and behaviour of women versus men, or
rather some features of women’s groups in particular. Also not clear is the
reason for any such differences in behaviour across genders or gender groups.
We examine these questions by analysing play in a public goods game in
northern Liberia in which the gender composition of groups making collect-
ive decisions over public goods was randomly assigned.3 We ﬁnd that women
did contribute substantially more than men, though only when they knew
that they were playing with other women. In public goods problems involving
equal numbers of men and women, men and women contributed similar
amounts, and markedly less on average than in the groups with only women
players.
This main ﬁnding partially supports the arguments of development practi-
tioners who seek to engage communities through women-only groups. It does
not provide clear evidence in favour of the assumption that women are per se
more community-minded when asked to make decisions between private and
social goods (though of course this could be the case for particular public
goods in particular settings).
It is one thing to ﬁnd that in a particular context all-female groups generate
more collective action, and another to explain why. In the second part of the
chapter we use Bayesian methods, data from surveys of game players, and
knowledge of a multiplier on contributions that was randomly varied across
players, to estimate a simple structural model of individual decisions about
howmuch to contribute. The goal is to gain insight into how the motivations
of the women acting in the all-women groups differed from those of men and
women in the mixed groups.
2 Duﬂo cautions, however, that for economic development, women’s empowerment ‘is not the
magic bullet it is sometimes made out to be’ (2012: 76), stressing that women face so many
constraints that any multiplier effects of alleviating any one may be limited or absent, and that
women’s empowerment can yield improvement in some dimensions at the expense of others.
3 The data (Fearon et al. 2014) can be accessed at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?
persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/28006.
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The model and data allow us to estimate the weight that people in our
sample put on four different underlying motivations, or preferences, that
could factor into different contribution decisions:
1. the value the individual places on the expected use of the total amount of
money raised;
2. the individual’s fear of discovery of their own contribution and thus
possible sanctioning;
3. the individual’s concern with matching what others do; and
4. the intrinsic value (or cost) the individual has for contributing, including
both opportunity costs for themoney donated and any positive value for
signalling ‘community spirit’ by contributing.
The results suggest that women in the all-women groups had stronger
intrinsic motivation to contribute than both women and men in the mixed
groups. That is, they would have contributed a substantial share of their
endowment irrespective of beliefs about what it would be spent on, fear of
discovery, or desire to match others’ contribution levels.
These patterns are consistent with ﬁeld observations suggesting that women
in the all-women communities may have contributed more in order to signal
that the women of their community have powerful community spirit. Thus a
sense of group solidarity and implicit competition—a social-identity effect—may
have favoured collective action. If this is correct, it would suggest a mechanism
that might favour channelling development aid through women-only groups in
some contexts, but not necessarily others.
In Section 2 we describe the context of our study and provide a description
of the experiment. In Section 3 we provide the basic results, showing differ-
ences in behaviour between gender groups and the effects of group compos-
ition. Section 4 compares our results with the most closely related results in
the literature, found in Greig and Bohnet (2009). Section 5 explores mechan-
isms more thoroughly, using a simple structural model to assess the role of
intrinsic incentives and three types of instrumental incentives, relating to
conformity concerns and concerns over sanctioning. While all three of these
appear to play a role, the differences in intrinsic incentives between condi-
tions appear most salient. In the concluding Section 6 we speculate, based on
the results presented and additional ﬁeld observations, about possible reasons
for the main ﬁnding. We suggest that the evidence for strong intrinsic motiv-
ation to contribute is consistent with the hypothesis that many game players
thought they were signalling community quality to potential donors. Women
in the all-women groups may have been more strongly motivated in this way
due to a social-identity effect—a sense that they were playing for, or repre-
senting, ‘team women’ of the village.
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2. A Public Goods Game in Post-Conﬂict Liberia
We examine differences in the effects of the gender composition of groups by
analysing play in a public goods game implemented in 2008 following an
international development intervention in Liberia.
As described in Fearon et al. (2015), we used a public goods game to assess the
effects of a community-driven reconstruction (CDR) program implemented
between 2006 and 2008 in 83 communities in two districts in northern Liberia,
Voinjama and Zorzor. Funded by the UK’s Department for International
Development and implemented by the International Rescue Committee, the
programme sought to foster reconciliation and improve local-level govern-
ance in the wake of a long civil war that ended in 2003, and that was
particularly intense in these districts. Secondarily, the implementers and
funders hoped that the funds provided would have positive economic effects.
The primary goal of the intervention, however, was institution building to
improve the collective action capacities of post-conﬂict communities.
Based on the popular model of ‘community-driven development’ (Mansuri
and Rao 2012), CDR works by giving communities power in selecting how the
offered aid will be used, and also in governing the implementation and
management of projects that result. The ‘catch’ is that communities are
required to construct and use donor-speciﬁed institutions for choosing and
managing the projects. In particular, under aid agency guidance, the commu-
nities elect community development committees (CDCs) in open elections
that (at least in this case) exclude the main traditional leaders (chiefs). The
CDCs then deliberate and hold town meetings to decide on how the develop-
ment funds provided will be spent, subject to some parameters given by the
aid agency.4
The public goods games, implemented in 2008 after the CDR interventions
were (almost entirely) completed, were our primary measurement strategy for
estimating whether the CDR programme had a causal impact on treated
communities’ ability to generate collective action after a devastating civil
war. The games presented both treated and control communities with a
small-scale challenge of organizing to raise funds that we would match at an
average rate of 250 per cent, for a project chosen entirely by the community in
4 In our case, projects had to be for community-wide rather than private or narrowly targeted
beneﬁt, and purchase of capital equipment for income-generating projects (such as a rice mill) was
not allowed. The projects chosen tended to involve construction of community facilities, such as
community meeting houses and guest houses (approximately 35 per cent), latrines (30 per cent),
and hand-dug wells (15 per cent). A few projects (less than 5 per cent) focused on school or health
clinic construction; almost none were in agriculture, skills training and small business
development, and other income-generating activities. The median value of total grants was
about US$13,000 for a community, the speciﬁc amount depending on the community’s size and
their proposals.
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whatevermanner they decided. Described to the communities as a ‘small-scale
development project’ in which they could obtain matching funds depending
on how much they raised from contributions made during the game, the
measurement strategy was intended to approximate the kind of real-world
collective-action problem communities had faced in the CDR programme
(which also required matching contributions), or indeed any community
collective problem.
The basic protocol was as follows: we held a community meeting in each of
the eighty-three villages, announcing that a public goods game would be
played the following week to determine how much ﬁnancing would be pro-
vided to a community for use in any way the community desired. Attendees of
the meeting were told that twenty-four households would be randomly
selected and then a randomly chosen adult from each of those households
would receive a sum of money (300 Liberian dollars, LD, or about US$5). The
game player could then decide, in private, how much of this to keep and how
much to contribute towards a public good. It was explained that after the
game had been played, we would hold another public meeting to open the
private contributions and then add our ‘matching’ contributions on top,
according to a multiplier known in advance to each game player and identi-
ﬁed on the envelope. The total amount raised would then be given to three
‘community representatives’ who could be selected by the village in any
manner they wished in the week between the ﬁrst community meeting and
game day.
Notice that communities knew that in the week between the initial meeting
and game day, they (or their leaders, or whoever) had time to decide how the
funding would be used and could engage in mobilization activities around
participation in the game. They did not know which individuals would be
picked to play and so could not lobby or pressure speciﬁc people.5
When we implemented the public goods game we included two variations
that would allow us to assess differences in play between men and women, as
well as the effects of group composition. The ﬁrst variation, similar to that
employed by Greig and Bohnet (2009), was that in half the communities
we sampled 24 women to play the game and in half we sampled 12 men
and 12 women. As a result, we have data on the individual contributions
of 504 men and 504 women in 42 communities, who played knowing that
other game players were 11 of the same gender and 12 of the other gender, and
of 971 women in 41 communities who played knowing that all 23 other game
players were women.
5 For greater detail on the development intervention and the public goods game, see Fearon et al.
(2015).
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The second variation is in the multiplier applied to contributions. Within
each village/gender block half the players had their contributions increased
by a factor of two and the other half had theirs increased by a factor of
ﬁve. Below, we use this variation to seek to assess the role of other-regarding
preferences in contribution decisions.
In addition to the games data we also gathered data from a survey imple-
mented immediately after a player made their private contribution choice. From
this survey we constructed a set of measures used in the analysis that follows.
Our focus in this chapter is on the main effect of the gender composition
treatment, the difference between contribution levels in the 42 ‘mixed’ commu-
nities where 12 men and 12 women played the game, and the 41 ‘all-women’
communities where 24 women were selected to play. This gender composition
treatment was assigned by us at random, independently from theCDR treatment
assignments. We should note that due to low power, we were not able to have a
treatment arm of villages in which only men were selected to play the game,
which limits our ability to draw some inferences, as discussed below.
3. Basic Results
The basic results are in evidence in the raw game data. Women in the mixed
condition give about the same as men—indeed slightly less (220 compared to
225 on average). But they give considerably more in the women-only condi-
tion (246). This latter effect can be interpreted causally as the effect of gender
composition on women’s contributions.
Table 10.1 shows these results with estimation of treatment effects imple-
mented at the village level, taking account of randomization blocks, including
status with respect to the CDR intervention (see Fearon et al. 2015 for details on
the randomization), together with Neyman standard errors and p values gener-
ated via randomization inference for the full sample of women (Column 1) as
well as for the urban and non-urban sub-populations.We see a large and strongly
statistically signiﬁcant treatment effect: 30 LD is approximately 28 per cent of
Table 10.1. Effects of gender composition
All In quarters Outside quarters
Mixed villages (12/12 male/female) 218.55 182.15 240.86
Homogeneous villages (24 female) 248.62 232.91 252.61
Difference (average treatment effect) 30.06 50.75 11.75
N 82 28 54
p (ri) 0.00 0.00 0.15
s.e. (Neyman) 9.43 13.59 11.73
Source: Authors’ own construction.
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one standard deviation of the average individual contributions in the mixed
communities, and it is almost twice the size of the average effect of getting the
400 per cent interest rate versus the 100 per cent rate.
In the second and third columns of Table 10.1, we report evidence of an
interesting and puzzling heterogeneity for which we have no conﬁdent
explanation. Of the 83 communities studied, 28 (12 assigned to all-women
and 16 to mixed) were ‘quarters’ of a larger town, and thus slightly more
urbanized than the remaining 55 villages, which were rural. Average contri-
butions in the public goods game were much lower in the quarters, reﬂecting,
perhaps, lower levels of organization and mobilization capacity (Fearon et al.,
2015). But we see that the gender composition effect is much larger in the
quarters: mixed communities in quarters generated very low contributions,
whereas the quarters where only women played did much better. In line with
our argument and interpretation of the evidence on the CDR treatment effect
in Fearon et al. (2015), this difference could result from women’s traditional
organizations functioning better for mobilization in the quarters than the
ofﬁcial chief and sub-chief system, which seemed less well established than
in the rural communities. But this is speculation.
Our goal in what follows will be to make sense of the basic pattern of
substantially greater collective action produced in the communities where
women knew that only other women were making contribution decisions,
versus communities where both men and women played the game.
4. Comparison with Greig and Bohnet (2009)
Greig and Bohnet (2009) implemented a study closely related to ours which
allows for the possibility of assessing the consistency of ﬁndings in two
locations on the continent.
Though our game was similar in many ways to the game studied in Kenya
by Greig and Bohnet (2009), a number of important differences are worth
highlighting. In the Kenya study all participants came from a single commu-
nity whereas in our study communities were the unit of randomization.
In Kenya, participants played in groups of four in a type of lab established at
the community centre; we worked with much larger groups of twenty-four
subjects that were randomly sampled from villages, with these subjects play-
ing in their own homes. The endowments in the Kenya game were smaller—
approx. US$0.64 rather than approx. US$5; the multiplier was 2 whereas ours
was either 2 or 5.6 Because of the different sizes of the groups, however, the
6 In Greig and Bohnet, for every x contributed, all four members received x/2.
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private returns to the public investment were much smaller in our study.
In the Kenya experiment, the players were the only beneﬁciaries of the
contribution—which could lead to a total value of less than US$3—whereas
in Liberia the entire village (median population of about 500) could in prin-
ciple beneﬁt from a project worth up to US$400. Also critical is the fact that
the Kenya experiment did not allow for pre-play communication whereas the
Liberia experiment did. In total, Greig and Bohnet (2009) studied 270 subjects
in 68 groups of 4 whereas we studied 1979 subjects in 83 groups of 24 (with
limited attrition).
A key feature of the Kenya analysis is the use of data on player expectations
about the play of others, generated by asking subjects about how much on
average they expected other game players to play. We have similar data for
Liberia, reported in Table 10.3, including a measure of the number of others
that players expected to contribute nothing; the number of others they
expected to contribute the full amount; an estimate of the expected average
contribution using these numbers; and a measure of whether they expected
men or women to contribute more, or about the same (recorded here as 0 for
men give more, 0.5 for the same, and 1 for women give more).
We see from Table 10.2 that expectations broadly tracked the compositional
condition. Women did not have higher expectations about the contributions
of others than men did in the mixed condition, but did have higher expect-
ations in the women-only condition. Nevertheless, women in both conditions
reported believing that womenwould contributemore thanmen in themixed
condition, while men on average said they expected equal contributions by
gender. These facts could on their own give rise to a belief in overall higher
levels of contribution by others in the women-only condition—a feature we
return to below.
Table 10.3 uses essentially the same speciﬁcation as in Greig and Bohnet
(2009, table 1); there is no interaction term in our model because we do not
have an all-male group, and we cluster standard errors at the group level (the
level of randomization). For ease of interpretation, we use women in mixed
groups as the base condition and then look at the differences for men, and for
Table 10.2. Expectations given different treatments
Women-homog. Women-mixed Men-mixed
Expected share giving 0 0.11 0.13 0.14
Expected share giving 300 0.85 0.80 0.81
Expected average amount given by others 273.45 258.66 254.52
Actual average given by others 245.93 223.03 222.81
Predict women give strictly more 0.83 0.73 0.48
Source: Authors’ own construction.
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women in all-female games (‘homogeneous’). The results in Column 2 use list-
wise deletion for the often-missing expectations variable; in Column 3 we
impute average community values for missing expectations, while controlling
for missingness and allowing for different effects for units with missing data.
We note that in this speciﬁcation, and later speciﬁcations that employ expect-
ations, the model includes a post-treatment variable (expectations), and the
other coefﬁcients can only be interpreted as direct effects conditional on
strong assumptions outlined in Baron and Kenny (1986).
We see some features here that are consistent with Greig and Bohnet and
some differences. First, our constant is considerably larger (as a share of
endowments) than those found in Kenya and more in line with, if not greater
than, those found elsewhere: even the group that contributed the least,
women in the mixed condition, gave about 220/300 = 73 per cent of their
endowment. Thus the evidence of weak social capital from the Kenya study is
not replicated here. This could be related to the facts that our participants were
on average members of relatively small rural communities rather than a large
urban slum, and that the communities also had a week to inform community
members about the game and the projects. On the other hand, as noted above,
personal returns from contributing were arguably much smaller in our setting
(because diffused over the broader community).
Second, as in the Kenya study, we ﬁnd that women give considerably less in
the mixed condition than in the women-only condition. In Greig and Bohnet
(2009) themarginal effect for women in themixed condition was a drop equal
to about 10 per cent of the endowment (it is not clear whether this effect is
signiﬁcant or not). We see a drop of 26 Liberian dollars (or 30 from the non-
parametric estimation in Table 10.1), which is also close to 10 per cent of the
Table 10.3. (External) replication of Table 1 (cols 1 and 2) in Greig and Bohnet (2009)
1 2 3 4
Constant 220.44
(8.39)**
106.97
(20.51)**
109.92
(20.49)**
86.71
(32.74)**
Homogeneous 25.50
(9.65)**
19.54
(10.54)
15.46
(8.68)
80.63
(40.24)**
Male 4.96
(6.92)
10.99
(9.33)
6.30
(6.88)
10.84
(35.21)
Expectations 0.38
(0.07)**
0.39
(0.07)**
0.47
(0.12)**
Homog. x Expectations 0.24
(0.15)
Male x Expectations 0.017
(0.13)
N 1979 1093 1979 1979
Note: ** indicates p < .01. Errors are clustered at the group level.
Source: Authors’ own construction; Greig and Bohnet 2009.
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endowment. In addition we see a strong relationship between expectations
and contributions, though our estimated coefﬁcient is considerably lower, at
close to one third compared to one half in Kenya.
An important point of difference between the results, however, is that we
do not see strong evidence that women contribute less than men in the
mixed condition. (We are unable to assess whether the effects of the mixed
condition are different for men and for women.) And so the explanation
provided in Greig and Bohnet for the effect of homogeneous groups on
women does not ﬁnd clear support here. Greig and Bohnet argue that women
have overly pessimistic expectations in the mixed conditions while men have
overly optimistic expectations. In contrast (see Table 10.2), women and men
have similar expectations in mixed groups—they are both overly optimistic—
and although women expect contributions to be about 14 LD higher in
homogeneous communities, this is nowhere near large enough to account
for differences in play, if the effects of expectations in Table 10.3 are to be
believed.7 Perhaps as importantly, as seen in the ﬁnal column, the estimated
effects of expectations appear to be weaker for women (by about 50 per cent)
in homogeneous groups.
5. Model and Implications for Interpreting the Evidence
If (inaccurate) differences in expectations cannot account for the effect of
composition, what can?
In Fearon et al. (2015) we found evidence that contributions were related to
greater levels of mobilization activity in the week before the game in CDR-
treated communities, although only in communities where both men and
women could be selected to play. Mobilization does not, however, appear to
explain why women contributed more in the women-only villages.
In the survey, we asked if the respondent had been contacted by anyone
about how to play the game, about the community project, or about staying
home on game day, and also about whether they knew of other community
meetings to discuss the game and whether they knew the community repre-
sentatives’ names. Table 10.4 shows that the average of yes or no responses
(yes equals 1) for these ﬁve questions is slightly greater for women in the
homogeneous groups versus women in the mixed groups, although this
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. The rates are about the same for
7 In contrast, the differences in beliefs are close to large enough in Greig and Bohnet to account
for the differences in play, at least using their model estimates. There, the homogeneous condition
was associated with a 13.5-percentage-point increase in expectations, which translates into a
0.5713.5 =7.7-point difference in behaviour, not very different to the observed 9.5-point
difference.
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women in the women-only condition as for men in mixed. Dividing the
sample by whether the community received the CDR programme (which
does appear to have affectedmobilization activity in themixed communities),
we see that in the no-CDR, mixed-group villages, women were markedly less
mobilized than women in the no-CDR, all-women villages. However, in the
CDR-treated villages, if anything, there is more mobilization of both genders
in the mixed groups. So overall this factor does not seem likely to explain why
contributions were higher in the women-only communities.
Experiments are excellent for drawing inferences about what causes what,
but, by itself, ﬁnding that X causes Y does not explain why this is. An
explanation is arguably more important in social science settings than in,
say, drug testing, since causal effects are more likely to differ across contexts.
This puts a greater premium on learning aboutmechanisms (which is arguably
where the ‘science’ is in biomedical research as well).
In what follows we develop a simple structural model of the decision to
contribute that has parameters of interest corresponding to four different
possible motivations for contributing. We then use a Bayesian hierarchical
model to estimate these structural parameters, and ﬁnally compare the esti-
mates and implications for women in the women-only villages to men and
women in the mixed villages. The idea is to use the structural model to help
with the problem of drawing inferences about mechanisms from a diverse set
of survey responses and the results of several experimental manipulations that
are themselves implemented at different levels.
We highlight that our analysis in this section is exploratory; althoughwe set
out to measure effects of composition on contributions we only focused on
parameter estimation after seeing the core results.
5.1. Model of Decision Making
We assume that when deciding what contribution xi 2 f0,1,2,3g to make,
players seek to maximize:
uiðxiÞ ¼ αixi  γi xi  pix^ið Þ2 þ rixi þ ϕiqixi
Table 10.4. Reports of mobilization activity by condition and CDR
treatment status, 0–1 scale
Women in all-women Women in mixed Men in mixed
All 0.46 0.41 0.47
No-CDR 0.47 0.33 0.42
CDR 0.45 0.48 0.51
Source: Authors’ own construction.
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where x^i is i’s expectation regarding the average contribution of others in the
same village, ri is i’s multiplier, and qi is the i’s perceived probability of having
his or her action discovered by others.8 For simplicity we ignore the expected
beneﬁts from contributions by others (these drop out under the assumption of
linear gains in the public good).
Note that we assume quasilinear utility and treat the valuation of the public
goods as the numeraire. This is captured by the absence of a coefﬁcient on rixi.
Recall that ri is either 2 or 5 and was randomly assigned to i by us; qi and x^i are
empirical measures derived from the survey data. Our structural parameters of
interest are αi, γi, ρi, and ϕi.
 Parameter αi reﬂects the intrinsic value of contributing to the public good.
This is often assumed to be negative, reﬂecting the opportunity cost of
not having the money for own spending, although we allow for the
possibility that it is positive on net. For example, it can be positive if
individuals feel sufﬁciently good about doing what they see as the right
thing, or they see making a contribution as a signal to the community, to
the foreign donors running the project, or even to themselves that they
are ‘good types’ who are community-spirited.9
 γi  0 and ρi  0 reﬂect conformity concerns: with ρi = 1 a player values
contributions equal to those of others contributing; with ρi < 1 a player
seeks to contribute less than others; and with ρi > 1 she seeks to contribute
more than others. Parameter γimeasures the weight that i puts onmatching
what he or she believes others are doing (or, more precisely, ρi times this).
 Parameter ϕi reﬂects i’s valuation of incentives arising from social rewards
or punishments from contributions. Note that we assume that players can
be concerned about sanctioning from the village for less-than-complete
contributions and do not assume that sanctioning relates only to devi-
ations from equilibrium play.
Individuals choose between options xi 2 f0,1,2,3g (in hundreds of Liberian
dollars). For purposes of estimation, we will assume that the most consequential
variation across individuals in a community is in αi, their marginal value for
contributing independent of use of the funds, or desire tomatch or avoid punish-
ment, relative to the othermotivations. Fixing the other parameters, the optimal
choice for individual i is increasing in αi and can be characterized by three cut-
points in αi of the form c
j
i ¼ ð2j 1Þγi  2γiρi x^i þ ri þ ϕiqið Þ for j ¼ 1,2,3.
8 Contributions and expected contributions by others were rescaled for the Bayesian analysis;
see replication code. In addition, q was rescaled to lie in [0.01,0.99].
9 Individual contributions were anonymous—not seen by the community—although game
players were told that their individual contributions could be observed by the researchers at a
later date.
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If αi < c1i then i optimally would choose xi = 0. If αi 2 c1i , c2i
 
then xi = 1 is
preferred; αi 2 c2i ,c3i
 
implies xi = 2, and xi = 3 if αi > c3i .
In particular, suppose that in a village the αi are distributed by the cdf F,
whereas the other parameters (γ, ρ, ϕ) depend only on gender and village-level
features, including whether the group composition in the village is mixed
or homogeneous. Then for each i we have probabilities for choices of
xi 2 f0,1,2,3g,wxi , where
w0i ¼ F c1i
 
w1i ¼ F c2i
  F c1i
 
w2i ¼ F c3i
  F c2i
 
w3i ¼ 1 F c3i
 
:
It follows that if we specify a distribution F for the αi—say, normal withmean α
and standard deviation σ—then we can compute the likelihood of the
observed choices of xi for the twenty-four game players in a particular com-
munity. The ﬁve unknown parameters entering the likelihood function—and
characterizing motivations to contribute—are Θ ¼ fα,σ,γ,ρ,ϕg.
For ease of reference Table 10.5 summarizes themeaning of eachmotivation
or preference parameter, along with some estimation assumptions discussed
in the next section.
5.2. Empirical Model
We use a multilevel Bayesian model to estimate the key parameters, letting
these be a function of respondent gender and treatment condition. Our model
estimates the parameters in the ﬁrst equation in Section 5.1, as a function of
treatment condition, taking q and x^ as given.10
Let θ[i] denote the value of the parameter θ 2 Θ that we use to calculate the
likelihood that person i chose the observed xi.
Under the assumption that αi is not observed, the likelihood is calculated
using the probability that an individual takes action xi 2 f0,1,2,3g, given by
the categorical distribution with event probabilities w as deﬁned above.
LðxiÞ ¼ fcategorical xijwðri ,qi , x^i ,α½i,ϕ½i,γ½i,ρ½i,σ½ið Þ
These individual-level parameters are generated from condition- and group-
level parameters as follows. Let Wi, Mi, and Hi denote indicator variables for
10 Thus in the model presented here we do not model x^ as a function of treatment, though this
can in principle be added as an additional component of the likelihood function. We note that
since x^ is post-treatment, treating it as ﬁxed, as done here and also in Greig and Bohnet (2009),
could in principle introduce post-treatment bias.
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Table 10.5. Parameter estimates
Parameter Motivation/preference Estimation assumptions Men (mixed) Women (mixed) Women-only Composition effect Pr > 0
αi i’s marginal value for
contributing independent of
use of funds, matching, and
sanctioning concerns
i’s marginal value for
contributing independent of
use of funds, matching, and
sanctioning concerns
– – – – –
α Mean of the distribution from
which αi is drawn
Varies by community and
potential condition for each
gender
0.76 0.2 5.13 5.33 0.92
σ Standard deviation of the
distribution from which αi is
drawn
Varies by potential condition 12.41 12.41 11.95 0.47 0.41
ϕ Weight on contributing to avoid
sanctioning/discomfort if
revealed to have given less
than 300 LD
Weight on contributing to avoid
sanctioning/discomfort if
revealed to have given less
than 300 LD
1.68 0.38 3.09 2.72 0.75
γ Weight put on matching target
contribution ρx^ i
Varies by potential condition for
each gender
3.07 2.95 2.07 0.88 0.04
ρ Share of reported expectation x^ i
that i would ideally match if no
other motivations
Varies by potential condition for
each gender
0.94 0.99 0.81 0.17 0.28
Notes: The composition treatment conditions are women-only and mixed. By ‘varies by potential condition’ we mean that there are distinct parameters for women for each of these two
conditions. σ is constrained to be the same for men and women in the mixed condition; the ﬁnal column shows the posterior probability that the difference between women-only and mixed
conditions (for women) is positive.
Source: Authors’ own construction.
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being a woman player in a mixed village, male in a mixed village, or female
in a homogeneous village, respectively, and let θj , j 2 fH ,W, Mg denote
condition-level parameters, described below.11
We let α and ϕ vary by condition and village as combinations of village-level
and condition-level features.
α½i ¼ MiαM þWiαW þHiαH þ υαv½i
ϕ½i ¼ MiϕM þWiϕW þHiϕH þ υϕv½i
where v[i] denotes the village to which i belongs. We assume the village-level
random effects have distributions given by: υαv  N μα ,σαð Þ and υϕv  N μϕ ,σϕ
 
.
Other parameters we let vary by condition only; thus for θ 2 fγ,ρ,σg:
θ½i ¼ MiθM þWiθW þHiθH
Each of these last three is constrained to be positive. In addition we constrain
σM¼σW . We employ diffuse priors on all parameters and hyperparameters,
given by normal (or half normal) distributions with mean 0 and standard
deviation of 5.
Thus we estimate different parameters for men and for women for each
treatment condition. That is, we use the model not simply to measure param-
eters but also to infer the counterfactual parameters that would arise were
women in different treatment conditions. We thus seek to assess whether
gains due to composition may be attributed to differences in instrumental
motivations deriving from expectations about the actions of others, concerns
around sanctioning, or differences in valuations of the public good or in terms
of intrinsic motivations. In addition we allow for considerable village-level
heterogeneity, at least for parameters α and ϕ.
5.3. Effects on Structural Parameters
Estimated posterior means for our ﬁve structural parameters in three condi-
tions (women-only, women in mixed communities, and men in mixed com-
munities) are shown in Table 10.5. There are two sorts of comparisons of
interest. First—andmost relevant to our question of why higher contributions
were made by women in the women-only groups—is the treatment effect of
the group’s gender composition on women players. For parameter θ this is
given by θH  θW in the ﬁfth column. Second, within each condition we can
compare the relevant weight the average respondent is estimated to have put
on different motivations. Recall that these numbers are relative to the value
11 We note a slight abuse of notation here since we let αi denote person i’s value for α as deﬁned
above, and αM, αF, αH denote condition-level parameters.
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put on money raised from the game for the community, which has been
normalized to 1.
Consider the treatment effects on women players ﬁrst. The most striking
positive effect we see here is the difference in α for women between condi-
tions. From these estimates, α—the village-/condition-level mean of the dis-
tribution of αi—is ﬁve points higher for women in the homogeneous
community, and is, on average, positive. This means that for the typical
woman in these groups, every 100 LD invested gives the equivalent of an
intrinsic 500 LD direct positive return in units of the value of the total funds
raised, independent of what anyone else does. With σ around 12, approxi-
mately one third face marginal costs of contributing and two thirds marginal
beneﬁts (more generally, these shares depend on the village-level intercept
also). By contrast, in the mixed group, the mean for women is negative and
close to 0, meaning that the typical woman gains no intrinsic beneﬁts from
contributing, and half face costs.
In the typical case we observe little responsiveness to fears of sanctioning
and see little difference across conditions.
We see relatively large negative effects on γ, however, meaning that in the
gender-homogeneous groups women put less weight on matching what they
expected others to contribute than they did when they knew they were playing
with men. Note that in most cases ρ is close to 1, though possibly lower in the
homogeneous group condition; thus if therewere no other considerations, both
men and women in the mixed groups would have wanted to match what they
thought others were doing, whereas women in the homogeneous condition
would have wanted to undercut others a bit (though the difference between
these is not tightly estimated). Overall, the matching incentives pulled offers
upwards whenever players were optimistic about the contributions of others.12
The result of this is that women in homogeneous groups had a substantially
weakermotivation to contribute in order tomatchwhat others were expected to
do, but this negative effect was more than offset by the increase deriving from
the greater intrinsic motivation to contribute that worked through α.13
The estimates also provide a sense of the relative importance of different
motivations in game players’ contribution decisions. For instance, in the
mixed groups, on average, both men and women have γ values around 3,
which means they put about three times the weight on the discomfort of
deviating from the expected contribution of others by 100 LD as they did on
12 In particular, we can see from the utility function that the marginal gains in contributions are
increasing in γ (that is,
δ2u
δxiδγ
> 0) when 2 xi  ρ x^ð Þ>0 or xi < ρ x^. Note that here we consider best
responses, treating expectations as exogenous.
13 The negative effect arising from the drop in γ is partially compounded by the drop in ρ, which
lowers women’s targets for matching.
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increasing the total contributed by 100 LD. Women in the homogeneous
condition similarly put more weight on conformity, though not as much as
in the mixed groups. The sanctioning concern seems to matter hardly at all
relative to the other motivations in any condition. As noted, the big difference
is in the weight put on contributing, independent of the total raised or the
conformity concerns. The suggestion is that especially for manywomen in the
homogeneous condition, but also to a smaller degree for men in the mixed
groups, contributing was typically not seen as a net cost that they would not
want to pay unless they thought that what the money raised would be spent
on would compensate them. Rather, the results suggest that for many game
players, the game did not have the structure either of a classical public good
problem, or of a simple coordination game in which contributing is costly but
one might do it for conformity reasons. Instead, for quite a few players,
contributing appears to have been a dominant strategy, independent of
hopes for what the money raised would be spent on.
6. Conclusion
Employing a public goods game in 83 villages in northern Liberia, we use
random assignment of gender composition of the groups of individuals mak-
ing contribution decisions to estimate the causal effect of playing with a
mixed-gender group versus a group comprising only women. We ﬁnd that
the all-women groups contributed substantially more to a community project
than did either men or women in the communities where both genders
played. This is therefore a group composition effect rather than a ‘women
are unconditionally more community-minded’ effect. Women contributed
more when they knew they were playing with other women, but not more
than men in the mixed groups.
Our main result thus supports the logic of practitioners who seek to engage
communities throughwomen-only groups. It does not provide clear evidence in
favour of arguments or the assumption that women are per semore community-
minded when asked to make decisions between private and social goods,
although this might be the case for particular public goods in particular settings.
The basic ﬁnding is similar to that of Greig and Bohnet’s (2009) lab experi-
ment conducted in a Nairobi slum, where groups of four played a public goods
game in different gender compositions. They also found that women contrib-
uted more in all-women groups than in mixed sets. The similarity is interest-
ing given the many differences in the set-up and context.
Our account of why women contribute more in women-only groups differs
from the explanation given in the Kenya experiment. In Kenya, differences
appeared to result from women holding overly pessimistic views about the
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behaviour of players in mixed groups (whereas men held overly optimistic
views). In contrast, in Liberia differences in the beliefs of men and women
were slight and differences in expectations across conditions did not appear
large enough to account for differences in contributions, at least when our
estimated model was employed.
Rather, our model and the data suggest that women placed great intrinsic
value on contributing to the production of public goods when they knew that
they were working collectively with other women. We cannot assess systemat-
ically whether this is because mobilization undertaken by women in advance
of play was more effective at clarifying appropriate norms of behaviour, or
extracting promises around behaviour, or whether the intrinsic motivations
stemmed from greater solidarity within the gender groups.
We close, however, with some speculation motivated by the model results
and ﬁeld observations. In the initial community meetings to introduce the
project and game, our local collaborators14 explained that we had two main
purposes: to provide some funds for a small development project that the
community could choose, and also to conduct research to understand better
the people and their lives in these communities. The second reason was given
as a way of explaining why we were employing the unusual game procedure,
which was referred to both as a process of raisingmatching funds (an idea that
many communities were familiar with), and as a ‘game’. (Using a local ana-
logy, participants and enumerators sometimes spoke of a ‘lucky ticket’, mean-
ing that getting picked to play was like winning a lottery.)
Attendees at the initial meetings where the game was explained immedi-
ately and audibly grasped the conﬂict between private and social good posed
by the decision of howmuch of the endowment to keep and howmuch to put
in the envelope. On one occasion (at least), an attendee was heard to say ‘They
are testing us’, meaning that his interpretation was that we wanted to learn
how community-spirited people in their village were. Our introductory scripts
emphasized that the decision to keep some or all of the endowment was
private and that it could be justiﬁable to do so—we avoided any language
clearly identifying contribution as the right choice. Nonetheless, a possible
inference by community members would have been that if the community
contributed a lot, they would be more likely to receive more development
assistance in the future.
If so, then game players may have had a rationale for contributing largely
independent of interest rates, expectations about others’ contributions, or
value for the community project. The act of contributing the whole endow-
ment may have been understood by some or many participants as a signal of
14 The Liberian non-governmental organization NEPI (Network for Empowerment and
Progressive Initiative).
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community spirit to outsiders thought to have access to more resources. It was
evident that residents of these impoverished communities were desperate for
‘development’, a term they frequently used. This rationale could explain some
part of our estimates of powerful intrinsic motivations to contribute.15
But how, if at all, might such a rationale explain the greater contributions of
women when they knew they were playing only with other women? This is
speculative, but a possibility suggested by some ﬁeld observations is that the
motivation to signal was greater the more a player identiﬁed with the deﬁned
set of other game players. Understanding yourself as a representative of ‘the
women’ of the community rather than as a random community member may
increase the desire to signal—to the outsiders, to the rest of the community,
and to yourself—that you and your group are made of the right material. On
hearing that only women could be chosen to play the game, the women in the
audience sometimes seemed to feel pleased and important, perhaps as if proud
or excited to be chosen as representatives of their community. (By contrast,
occasionally one or two men would lose interest and walk away when it was
announced that only women could be chosen.)
If correct, this interpretation also sheds light on the effects of the CDR
programme itself. We note that these effects of the composition treatment
are quite different from the effects on parameter values we estimate for the
CDR treatment, using an analogous model. In models that include parameters
for CDR effects (not reported here) we see that although both CDR and gender
homogeneity are associated with greater contributions, parameter estimates
suggest that CDR is associated with a drop in α which is offset by changes in γ
and ρ. This is consistent with an interpretation in which group homogeneity
induces identity concerns, whereas CDR facilitates collective action through
enhanced coordination. Though CDR is sometimes promoted as a way of fos-
tering greater group identity, these results, consistent with our analysis in Fearon
et al. (2015), suggest that it was organization and not identity that mattered.
The speculation above is in line with a large literature and tradition, notmuch
known or drawn on in the design of development interventions, of motivating
collective action by appeals to subgroup solidarity or even between-group com-
petition.16 It is understandable that development practitioners, who put a high
premium on inclusion and avoidance of conﬂict, would not consider trying to
generate collective action by thesemeans. But perhaps creative thinkingmight
15 We note that this motivationmight also bias our expectations measure upwards, contributing
to the apparent ‘over-optimism’we observe. That is, when asked howmuch they thought others in
the community would contribute in the game, some respondents may have been saying, in effect,
‘A lot, because this is a good community you should bring development to’.
16 It is unfortunate that with only 83 communities under study we did not have the power to
include a third treatment of villages where only men could play the game. This might have shed
light on whether we observed an ‘all-women’ effect or a single-gender group effect.
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be able to harness the power of group identiﬁcation and competition in order
to generate collective action in support of development projects, without, or
with minimal, downside risks.
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